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Using data from the British Household Panel Survey we analyze the impact of second tier pension 
schemes on voluntary job mobility within a discrete time hazard rate modelling framework. We 
find that workers covered by occupational pension plans have significantly lower quit rates, 
independently of their participation decision. Contrary to common policy suggestions, pension 
portability losses are not important in explaining quits. However, when we account for 
occupational pensions' endogeneity through instrumental variables, we find that their negative 
impact on quit hazards is due to "selection on unobservables". 
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1 Introduction
Notwithstanding the pension reforms implemented in the last three decades, portability
of occupational pension rights is still a matter of public policy concern in the UK. While
provisions such as the reduction of the vesting period, ination indexation of deferred
rights and the introduction of transfer options, have improved the position of early
leavers from occupational pension plans, there is still concern among policy analysts
that a lack of pension portability could be detrimental to labour market e¢ ciency.1 This
view links in a causal way the evidence on lower job mobility of workers participating to
occupational pension plans and the nancial penalties imposed to early leavers by plans
of the dened benet type. While receiving some support in the early literature,2 this
view has also been challenged by alternative arguments, like "pension wage premia"3
and "selection" into pension schemes.4 However, conclusive evidence has not yet been
produced. Moreover, most studies focus on the US, while the few studies available for
the UK usually do not account for workersselection into pension arrangements.
The selection issue is particularly relevant in the UK context. The neat feature
of the UK system of pension provision is that individuals who are o¤ered the chance
to join their employers scheme can choose to make alternative pension arrangements.
This means that it is possible to compare job turnovers of those in pension covered
jobs who choose not to join that scheme with the job turnovers of those in pension
covered jobs who did choose to join. We exploit this feature of the UK pension system,
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estimating the impact of available pension choices on quit hazards. Moreover, we
address the endogeneity of occupational pensions through an instrumental variables
identication strategy. In particular, we exploit the exogenous variation provided by
regional occupational pension o¤er rates to identify the impact of occupational pension
schemes on quits. The results show that the e¤ect of occupational pension schemes on
quit hazards changes signicantly while moving from a "simple" hazard model to an
"IV" hazard model. In the former, workers covered by an occupational pension scheme
have signicantly lower quit rates. In particular, once covered, workers who decide
to join the scheme are found equally less likely to quit than those who decide not to
join. Contrary to common policy suggestions, pension portability losses are not found
to be important in explaining quit hazards. Once we account for the endogeneity of
occupational pension coverage, we nd that the observed negative relationship between
occupational pensions and quits is due to "selection on unobservables".
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the current structure of the UK system of pension provision. Section 3 focuses on
the portability of occupational pension rights and its regulation in the UK. Section
4 reviews the UK literature. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 introduces the
empirical model. Section 7 illustrates the results and the IV identication strategy.
Section 8 concludes.
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2 The Current System of Pension Provision in the UK
The current UK pension system has a three tiered structure. A at-rate rst-tier pen-
sion is provided by the state and is known as the Basic State Pension (BSP). Second-tier
pensions are provided by the state, employers and private sector nancial institutions.
Finally, there is a third tier of voluntary private retirement saving.
The wide variety of retirement pension plans currently o¤ered in the UK is the
result of a number of reforms undertaken over the last 25 years.5 An important feature
of this reform process is represented by the contracting-outmechanism, introduced
originally in 1978 as a means of integrating existing occupational dened benet (DB)6
pension schemes into the new State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). While
employees with earnings between a Lower Earnings Limit (LEL) and an Upper Earnings
Limit (UEL) were automatically enrolled into SERPS, initially they were also given the
option of contracting-out into an approved DB scheme. The 1986 Social Security Act
extended the contracting-out option to approved dened contribution (DC)7 schemes
and to approved personal pensions.8 The 1999Welfare Reform and Pensions Act further
extended the contracting-out option to Stakeholder Pension Schemes (SPS),9 introduced
in April 2001. The Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 abolished
SERPS replacing it, since April 2002, with the State Second Pension (S2P). The S2P
was initially earnings-related but from April 2007 becomes a at-rate benet, even
though contributions are earnings-related.
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There is no obligation on employers to operate their own pension scheme,10 nor, since
1988, is there any contractual requirement for an employee to join the employers scheme
if it has one. Moreover, employees can always decide to remain into the state scheme
or to later reenter it. Finally, individuals can eventually top up their occupational or
personal pension with additional voluntary contributions or free-standing additional
voluntary contributions (up to the limits permitted by the Island Revenue).11
Tables 1 and 2 report gures elaborated from the Occupational Pensions Schemes
Survey collected over the 90s by the Government Actuary.12 Table 1 indicates that
there has been a downward trend in private sector occupational pension schemesmem-
bership over the decade. Alternatively, the distribution of active members by type of
plan has remained relatively stable over time, with more than 80 percent of plan par-
ticipants belonging to DB plans. Table 2 indicates that the level of contracting-out also
has been fairly stable over time, with more than 80 percent of private sector workers
participating to contracted-out plans. Most workers participate to contracted-out DB
plans - Contracted-Out Salary Related (COSR) schemes - while a minority of workers
participate to contracted-out DC plans - Contracted-Out Money Purchase (COMP)
schemes. A minority of workers participate to Contracted In Salary Related (CISR) or
Money Purchase (CIMP) schemes.
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3 Pension Portability
Portability of occupational pension rights is usually limited and depends to a great
extent on the DB/DC nature of the plan. First, a vesting period is typically required
in all plans.13 Second, the backloaded structure of pension rightsaccrual in DB plans
impose further separation penalties to vested early leavers. In traditional DB plans the
sponsoring employer promises the payment of a retirement pension annuity PR :
PR = b(R  tk 1)W (R); (1)
where (R  tk 1) are service years accumulated from tk 1 (age of hire) to R (retirement
age), b is the annual (percentage) accrual rate, W (R) is the retirement wage. Condi-
tional upon remaining with the employer until retirement, at each age tk; the worker
will be accumulating a pension wealth P staytk :
P staytk = b(R  tk 1)A(tk)W (tk)eg(R tk)e i(R tk); (2)
where A(tk) is the annuity factor transforming pension annuities in pension wealth,
W (tk) is the wage earned at tk; eg(R tk) is a wage growth factor,14 and e i(R tk) is a
discount factor.15 Leaving the employer before completion of the vesting period, the
worker forfeits her pension rights. Leaving the employer at age tk -after vesting and
before retirement- the worker is entitled to receive a pension annuity based on the salary
at tk (rather than at R):
P leavetk = b(R  tk 1)A(tk)W (tk)e i(R tk): (3)
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Pension separation penalties arise if a worker will receive a pension that has a value
less than her implicit pre-separation contributions, including both explicit payments
to the plan and any reduction in wages below the opportunity wage. This is usually
the case in DB plans.16 Assuming that early leavers nd another job with the same
characteristics, and that g = i, their portability loss is dened as the di¤erence between
(2) and (3) :
PLosstk = b(tk   tk 1)A(tk)W (tk)(1  e i(R tk)): (4)
Pension portability rules are set by pension plans within the standards dened by
law. In the UK the situation of early leavers has improved over the last 30 years. Before
1975, early leavers had no legal right to transfer their accrued pension entitlements to
a new scheme or even to receive deferred benets from their old scheme. Under the
current rules, the vesting period is set at 2 years, while vested early leavers from a DB
plan can take a tax free transfer value to a di¤erent occupational pension scheme or to
an approved personal pension or to purchase a retirement annuity. Alternatively, they
can have their accrued rights preserved in the pension scheme as deferred benets, to
be revalued until retirement in line with the Retail Price Index, up to a maximum of 5
percent. If the latter option is chosen, the pension loss formula should to be modied
to account for the limited price indexation ():
PLosstk = b(tk   tk 1)A(tk)W (tk)(1  e( i)(R tk)): (5)
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4 Literature
The impact of employer provided pension plans on individual job mobility choices has
been widely investigated in the US pension literature. Early empirical studies document
a signicant negative correlation between plan participation and job mobility.17 More
recently, arguments such as pension portability losses,18 pension wage premia19 and
selection into pension jobs20 have been proposed to explain this stylized fact. While
no conclusive evidence emerge in the literature, the available evidence on the UK is
limited to ve previous studies.
McCormick and Hughes (1984) estimate turnover logit equations on 1974 General
Household Survey (GHS) data. They nd that pension workers are signicantly less
likely to move and that pension capital losses - proxied by an interaction term between
tenure and a pension dummy - have a negative and signicant impact. Henley, Disney
and Carruth (1994) estimate job separation hazard rates on 1985 GHS data. They
nd that occupational pension scheme membership and a quadratic pension-tenure
interaction term signicantly decrease the hazard, while transferability of pension rights
increases it.
Mealli and Pudney (1996) is the only study that takes into account the potential
endogeneity of pension choices. They estimate a random-e¤ects competing risks model
on retrospective data drawn from the 1988-1989 Retirement Survey. They nd a strong
positive association between the length of job tenure and pension participation status,
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and no role for unobservables. Disney and Emerson (2002) estimate probit models of
job mobility using BHPS data. They nd that not only those who join an occupational
pension plan o¤ered by their employer but also those who decline to join it have signif-
icantly lower mobility rates. Although Disney and Emerson (2002) suggest that their
results could be explained by di¤erent selection processes inducing alternative pension
choices, their empirical strategy does not account for the endogeneity of pension choices.
Both Mealli and Pudney (1996) and Disney and Emerson (2002) do not estimate the
role of pension quit disincentives. A last study by Andrietti (2003) provide evidence on
the impact of occupational pensions and pension portability losses on quits. Estimating
a switching regression model of job mobility on data from the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) survey, Andrietti (2003) nds that workers participating to
occupational pension plans in the UK are signicantly less likely to move, while pension
portability losses do not play a mobility impeding role.
The contribution of the present paper to the existing pension literature is threefold.
First, we exploit the richness of a data set that provides detailed information on occu-
pational and personal pension participation status and that follows individuals over a
relatively long time period to estimate the impact of available pension choices on quits.
Second, we account for the endogeneity of occupational pension choice through an in-
strumental variable identication strategy. Finally, we explicitly test for the impact of
pension portability losses on quits.
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5 Empirical Model
We are interested in modelling the length of the employment spell for individuals with
their current employer. Individuals in the sample are indexed by i = 1; :::::; n; while
the passage of calendar time is set in integer years. Year di = 1 is the year in which
the respondent started working with the current employer (and is before the sample
selection year). Let di = ji index the sample selection year, which can be di¤erent for
di¤erent individuals. Each of the respondent is then interviewed approximately one year
later. If the individual subsequently moves we denote the length of the spell running
after the rst interview date by ki. So, the calendar time of a spell end is denoted by
di = ji + ki. Otherwise, ki denotes the censoring point at the end of the observation
window. Our panel is unbalanced in that we follow individuals until they are no more
observed in their current employmentspell, either because they experience a job to
job transition or because they drop out from the survey, or because they experience
a transition to another labour market state. Respondents experiencing a job to job
transition before the end of the observation window contribute complete duration data.
All the others contribute censored duration data, with censoring immediately before
the end of the interval between two consecutive waves. However, observations censored
because they remained with the current employer are still at risk of experiencing a
transition during the observation period.
Suppose that job to job transitions are determined as discrete time counterparts to
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an underlying continuous time proportional hazards model:
i(t) = (t) exp(x
0
it); (6)
where (t) denotes the baseline hazard, xit is a vector of time variant/invariant ex-
planatory variables, and  is a vector of unknown coe¢ cients. The discrete time hazard
denotes the probability of the current employment spell being completed by time t+1,
given that it was still continuing at time t; and is given by:
hi(t) = 1  exp

 
Z t+1
t
i(u)du

= 1  exp  exp(x0it)(t)	 ; (7)
where:
(t) =
Z t+1
t
(u)du (8)
denotes the integrated baseline hazard. We do not specify any functional form for (t)
and estimate the model semiparametrically. In order to avoid the bias deriving from
the fact that we are using a stock sampling rather than a ow samplingdesign,
we need to condition transition rates on the length of the spell at the rst interview
date.21 The individual likelihood contribution can be written as:
Li = ci lnhi(ji + ki) +
ji+ki 1X
t=ji+1
ln fln(1  hi(t)g
= ci ln
 
1  exp   expx0it+(ji + ki)	 (9)
 
ji+ki 1X
t=ji+1
exp

x0it+(t)
	
where ci is a censoring indicator that takes the value 1 if di is uncensored and zero
otherwise. The model can be estimated through binary outcome models where duration
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dependence is built into the specication through period specic constants.22 Moreover,
the model can be estimated separately for quits (voluntary separations) and layo¤s
(involuntary separations), while viewed as competing risks.23 In this paper we focus on
quits, using a logit specication of the hazard.24 Under the competing risks framework
the quit hazard is estimated by treating durations terminated in a layo¤ as censored.
Our basic model specication includes among the regressors four dummy variables
indicating pension schemes participation status: joining an occupational pension plan
once o¤ered by the employer, not joining an occupational pension plan and contract out
a personal pension plan, not joining an occupational plan and remaining in the state
scheme, and, nally, contracting out a personal pension while not being o¤ered an
occupational pension plan. These dummies correspond to the available pension choices
in the UK system, keeping as reference category those workers who were not o¤ered
an occupational pension plan and remained into the state scheme. However, it may
be true that individual pension status is endogenous with respect to the duration of
employment. Endogeneity would lead to a spurious correlation between pension status
and job tenure. In order to account for it we use an instrumental variable identication
strategy, described in subsection 7.2.
6 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis are from waves 1 to 12 of the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS). Started in 1991, the survey has a longitudinal design, covering a
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nationally representative random sample of the UK population. We select a sample of
private - non agricultural, no construction - sector full time male employees aged 25 to 50
and interviewed at least in two consecutive waves during the observation period.25 We
follow individuals until they separate from their current employer. Every year, working
age individuals are asked to complete their employment history over the previous year,
indicating the end of any employment spell and the motivations behind it. This allows
us to dene quits, or voluntary separations, as job separations motivated either by
the take up of a better job with a di¤erent employer or by other personal related
reasons. The BHPS also contains a number of questions about employees pension
arrangements. Employees are asked if their current employer runs an occupational
pension scheme for which they are eligible, if they participate into it and if they have
contracted a personal pension. These questions allow us to recover the pension status
of each employee. Unfortunately, participants to an occupational pension plan are not
asked to provide a description of their plan. This prevents us to estimate separately
the role of DB and DC plans. However, in the empirical analyisis potential portability
losses are computed for all employees participating to an occupational pension scheme
as if the latter was the "typical" UK private sector DB plan.26 While this assumption
implies a possible upward bias of the portability loss e¤ects, we also believe that it
is a reasonable approximation, given the low proportion of workers in DC plans and
the high degree of similarity among DB schemes in the UK.27 We report in Table 4
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pension schemesparticipation rates of individuals when rst observed in our sample.
More than three quarters are o¤ered an occupational pension scheme, and 80 percent
of them join the scheme.28 About 60 percent of those who decline to join contract out
a personal pension, while the others remain in the state scheme. Among workers not
o¤ered an occupational pension, 56 percent contract out a personal pension.
Table 5 summarizes quits over the observation period by pension participation sta-
tus. In our sample, the quit rate of workers participating to an occupational pension
plan is about four times lower of that of workers not o¤ered an occupational pension
arrangement and staying into SERPS. It is interesting to note that also workers who
decline to join an occupational pension plan o¤ered by their employer have lower quit
rates. Overall, workers o¤ered an occupational pension scheme, independently of their
take-up decision, have a quit rate of 4,6 percent against the 11,3 percent quit rate of
workers not o¤ered any occupational scheme. These results are suggestive of a nega-
tive correlation among occupational pension coverage/participation and job mobility.
However, the observed di¤erences in quit rates could be due to observable and/or unob-
servable characteristics correlated with pension status. Indeed, Table 6 indicates that
workers in di¤erent second tier pension arrangements are di¤erent along many other
observable dimensions. In particular, workers covered by occupational pension plans
earn higher hourly wages, are more likely to be union members, to have a degree and to
be in large rms. To account for these observable di¤erences a multivariate approach
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is taken. We also investigate the role of unobservables simultaneously a¤ecting pen-
sion choices and employment duration through an instrumental variables identication
strategy.
7 Results
7.1 Simple Quit Hazards
The estimated coe¢ cients for the proportional quit hazard model are reported in Ta-
bles 7 and 8.29 We assume a exible semiparametric piece-wise form for the baseline
hazard. Duration dependence is captured through 12 job duration dummies, one for
each of the rst eleven years and a further dummy that groups durations over 12 years.
The estimates in column (1) of Table 7 indicate that not only workers participating
to occupational pension plans but also workers that although being o¤ered a scheme
decide not to join, either opting out for a personal pension or staying into the state
scheme, are signicantly less likely to quit. Alternatively, workers not o¤ered an occu-
pational pension scheme but contracting out a personal pension are not less likely to
quit at signicant levels. The estimated coe¢ cients on occupational pension dummies
are very close to each other. A test of their equality is not rejected at 99 percent sig-
nicance level. The estimates on the other variables indicate that children negatively
a¤ect quits, while family size and experience increase the likelihood of voluntary sep-
arations. The baseline quit hazard estimates, reported in Column (1) of Table 8 show
a signicant negative although non-monotonic shape. Until the 3rd year, the hazard is
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monotonically decreasing. Upward spikes are found at the 3rd, 6th, 8th and 12th year
of the spell. Column (2) of Table 7 reports results from a second specication of the
quit hazard, which aims to capture the e¤ect of nancial quit losses on the likelihood to
quit. Contrary to common policy predictions, pension portability losses are not found
to be signicant at standard levels. These results are consistent with those provided by
Disney and Emerson (2002) and Andrietti (2003). They suggest that the most relevant
pension status a¤ecting the quit decision is whether the individual holds an occupa-
tional pension covered job. This may reect "endogenous choice", and thus selection
into occupational pension jobs, as well as the fact that workers in occupational pension
jobs may be less likely to leave because they are in "good jobs", that is jobs paying
wages above competitive levels.
These results also suggest that we may use a more parsimonious specication. Given
that we cannot reject equality of the occupational pension dummies coe¢ cients, we
group them in a single dummy indicating if the worker is covered by an occupational
pension. Moreover, given the non signicance of the personal pension dummy for
non covered workers we extend the reference category to all workers not o¤ered an
occupational pension scheme. Results from estimates of this alternative specication
are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Tables 9 and 10. The results are similar to those
reported in Tables 7 and 8. However, the advantage of using this specication is that
it allows us to address the endogeneity of the occupational pension coverage dummy
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exploiting the exogenous variation provided by the only available instrumental variable.
7.2 IV Quits Hazards
To address pension endogeneity we focus on the specication used in Column (1) of
Tables 9 and 10, which excludes pension portability losses. The use of this specication
is motivated by the lack of signicance of the pension loss variable. We use an instru-
mental variables (IV) identication strategy. In general, IV estimation requires at least
one explanatory variable satisfying an exclusion restriction which is directly related to
the identication issue: the variable used as an instrument must not have any direct
inuence on the outcome variable, while any inuence on it should be only indirect
through the instrumented explanatory variable. Our instrument for the occupational
pension coverage dummy variable is the occupational pension o¤er rate by region of
residence. The latter variable, whose variation is reported in Table 12, should be corre-
lated with the choice to take up an occupational pension job. However, the validity of
our instrument relies on the mantained assumption that individuals do not choose their
region of residence. Given their region of residence, individuals face an occupational
pension o¤er rate in that region which a¤ect their probability of entering in an occupa-
tional pension job. Occupational pension coverage choice is modelled as a reduced form
and should be seen as the result of employer/employee decisions. When discussing IV
estimation methods the focus is usually on linear outcome equations. In our case we
deal with a nonlinear outcome (logit) equation. Consistent two step estimation in the
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resulting class of simultaneous probability models has been discussed by Mallar (1977)
and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996). Recent applications include Dearden, Machin,
Reed and Wilkinson (1997), Veum (1997) and Hujer, Maurer and Wellner (1999). They
all estimate probit models to obtain individual training participation propensities which
are then used to instrument potentially endogenous training variables in job mobility
equations. We follow a similar approach. We estimate a probit occupational pension
coverage equation which includes the regressors in the quit hazards and the occupa-
tional pension o¤er rate.30 It is also possible to ignore the dicotomous nature of the
dependent variable and estimate the occupational pension coverage equation as a lin-
ear probability model (LPM). This allows to relax the normality assumption imposed
by the probit model on the error terms and to estimate the equation by least square.
The estimated results for these models are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table
11 respectively, and conrm the validity of our instrument in explaining signicantly
the occupational pension coverage decision31. The second step in the IV procedure
requires computing predicted probabilities of occupational pension coverage and sub-
stituting them for the occupational pension coverage dummy in the quit hazard. The
results of the IV quit hazard are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Tables 9 and 10.32
Comparing these results with those in Column (1) we notice that the impact of occupa-
tional pension coverage on quit hazards is now not signicant at standard levels, even
switching to positive when we use the LPM in the rst step. Alternatively the other
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coe¢ cients remain virtually unchanged. Exogeneity of occupational pension coverage
status in the quit hazard is also rejected using an Hausman (1978) test.33 These results
seem to indicate that the negative relationship between occupational pension coverage
and quits is due to "selection on unobservables" and conrm the importance of taking
into account of the endogeneity of pension choices, an issue that is disregarded by most
of the empirical literature.
8 Conclusions
This paper analyzes voluntary separations of private sector male employees in the UK
using an hazard rate modelling framework. The aim is to evaluate the impact of sec-
ond tier pension schemes choice and portability rules on voluntary job mobility. Our
main nding is that the impact of occupational pension status on quit hazards changes
signicantly moving from a simple model to an instrumental variable hazard model. In
the former, workers either o¤ered and participating or o¤ered but not participating to
an occupational pension plan are found to have signicantly lower quit rates. However,
once endogeneity is accounted for through instrumental variables these e¤ects are no
more signicant. Alternatively, the e¤ect of pension portability losses on quit hazards is
never signicant. These results seem to indicate that the negative relationship between
occupational pension coverage and quits is due to spurious correlation and conrm the
importance of taking into account of the endogeneity of pension choices, an issue that
is disregarded by most of the empirical literature. From a policy perspective, our re-
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sults cast doubts on the e¤ectiveness of pension portability reforms on fostering labour
mobility, suggesting that the lower job mobility rate of pension covered workers may
be attributed to unobservable individual traits (eg. lower discount rates) or to a better
quality of these jobs (e. g. in terms of wage rates) rather than to the costs associated
with pension portability losses.
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Notes
1See Dorsey (1995).
2See Ippolito (1985, 1987, 1991) and Allen, Clark and McDermed (1988, 1993). McCormick and
Hughes (1984) and Henley, Disney and Carruth (1994) provide evidence for the UK.
3Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), Ippolito (1994).
4Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993), Ippolito (1997).
5These reforms are known as Thatcher reforms (Social Security Act 1980, Social Security Act 1986),
Major reforms (Pension Act 1995), and Blair reforms (Welfare Reform and Pension Act 1999, Child
Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000).
6In a DB plan workerspension benets are determined on the basis of an accrual rate, years of
plan participation and nal salary.
7In a DC plan an individual account is opened for each worker. Contributions are invested in
nancial assets.
8Personal Pension Schemes are individual DC pension accounts o¤ered by nancial institutions and
usually not linked to a particular employer.
9SPS are dened contribution schemes set up by employers, representative, membership or a¢ nity
organizations, or nancial services companies. Although they are similar to personal pensions, they
have to meet minimum standards for charges-access-terms. Employers without an occupational scheme
and with at least ve sta¤ must o¤er access to SPS.
10Employers can also sponsor a "contracted-in" occupational pension scheme supplementing, rather
then substituting, SERPS/S2P pension benets.
11Individuals can participate to occupational and personal pension schemes at the same time only
if the occupational scheme is "contracted-in" or if the personal pension scheme is used to receive a
transfer payments from a previous scheme.
12Government Actuarys Department (1995, 2001, 2003).
13The vesting period represents the minimum length of service to be completed in order to obtain
pension rightsentitlement.
14g accounts for workers expected wage increases reecting rms wage-tenure prole, overall pro-
ductivity growth and ination.
15i is the workers expected nominal interest rate.
16See Ippolito (1985) and Kotliko¤ and Wise (1985).
17See Mitchell (1983) among others.
18Ippolito (1985, 1987, 1991), Allen, Clark and McDermed (1988, 1993).
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19Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), Ippolito (1994).
20Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993), Ippolito (1997).
21See Jenkins (1995).
22See Sueyoshi (1995).
23See Narendranathan and Stewart (1993).
24The complete set of results including job separation and layo¤ hazard models are available upon
request from the author.
25These age limits are set in order to avoid sample selection issues related to labour force attachment
of younger workers and retirement of older workers.
26Table 3 reports the assumptions used in the computation.
27See Tables 1 and 2
28Di¤erences with the gures provided by the Government Actuarys Department (1995, 2001, 2003)
may be due to the fact that our sample is dened on a more restricted age range, excluding females,
construction and part time employees.
29Logit coe¢ cients are reported. Standard errores are reported in parenthesis. Statistical signicance
is denoted with one (90 percent) or two (95 percent) asterisks.
30In this case, an instrument is not strictly required given that identication is guaranteed by the
nonlinearity of the probit model.
31Included in the model but not reported here are 11 dummies for job tenure. The estimated
coe¢ cients have been transformed into marginal e¤ects. Bootstrapped standard errors (1.000 draws)
are reported in parenthesis, while the coe¢ cients statistical signicance is indicated with one (90
percent) or two (95 percent) asterisks. The complete set of results is available upon request.
32Bootstrapped standard errors (1.000 draws) are reported in parenthesis, while the coe¢ cients
statistical signicance is indicated with one (90 percent) or two (95 percent) asterisks.
33This method involves estimating a specication of the hazards which includes both the actual and
the predicted values of occupational pension coverage as regressors and testing the null hypothesis that
the coe¢ cients on the predicted values are equal to zero. The test statistic obtained allows to reject
exogeneity at standard signicance levels.
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Table 1: Private Sector Pension Schemes Members by Plan Type
1991 1995 2000
Millions % Millions % Millions %
DB Plans 5.3 81.5 4.87 80 4.6 80.7
DC Plans 1 14.3 1.1 18 0.9 15.7
Hybrid Plans 0.2 4.7 0.3 4.9 0.2 3.5
Total Active Members 6.5 100 6.2 100 5.7 100
Private Sector Workers 15.8 16 17
OP Members in % of Private Sector Workers 40 39 36
Source: Government Actuarys Department (1995, 2001, 2003)
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Table 2: Private Sector Pension Schemes Members by Plan Type and Contracting Out Status
1991 1995 2000
Millions % Millions % Millions %
DB Plans
COSR 4.6 90.2 4.13 87.3 4.1 89.1
CISR 0.5 9.8 0.57 12.7 0.5 10.9
DC Plans
COMP 0.4 44.4 0.46 42 0.3 33.3
CIMP 0.5 55.6 0.64 58 0.6 66.7
Total contracting-out 5 84 4.6 80 4.4 83
Source: Government Actuarys Department (1995, 2001, 2003)
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Table 3: Assumptions for Portability Loss Computation
Annual Accrual Rate 1/60
Pensionable Wage Final Wage
Normal Retirement Age 60
Expected Ination Rate 3%
Expected Nominal Wage Growth Rate 5%
Post-Retirement Indexation 3%
Early LeaversIndexation 3%
Nominal Discount Rate 5%
Ination Adjusted Discount Rate 2%
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Table 4: Pension Schemes Coverage and Participation
O¤ered OP 77.33
O¤ered OP - joined 60.77
O¤ered OP - not joined - PP 9.81
O¤ered OP - not joined - SERPS 6.75
Not O¤ered OP 22.67
Not O¤ered OP - PP 12.77
Not O¤ered OP - SERPS 9.90
Sample Size 1.081
Source: Our Elaboration on BHPS Data
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Table 5: Quits by Pension Status
O¤ered OP 4.63
OP Member 4.28
O¤ered OP, No Joined-PP 6.90
O¤ered OP, No Joined-SERPS 6.44
Not O¤ered OP 11.26
Not O¤ered OP-PP 8.54
Not O¤ered OP-SERPS 15.98
Sample Size 4.427
Source: Our Elaboration on BHPS Data
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Table 6: Summary Statistics (Mean) by Pension Status
O¤ered OP Not O¤ered OP
Joined PP SERPS All PP SERPS All
Quits .043 .069 .064 .046 .16 .085 .113
Married (%) .85 .73 .75 .83 .79 .72 .77
Age 38.7 34.7 35.3 38.1 37.7 34.7 36.7
Children 1 .89 .74 1 .83 .73 .79
Household Size 3.3 3.1 3 3.2 3.1 3 3.06
Spouse Employed (%) .66 .59 .55 .65 .64 .56 .61
Union Member (%) .49 .28 .27 .34 .12 .09 .115
Manager & Professional (%) .35 .23 .18 .33 .25 .19 .23
White Collar Worker (%) .19 .17 .2 .19 .16 .16 .16
Medium Firm (%) .34 .36 .42 .35 .10 .11 .107
Large Firm (%) .28 .16 .17 .26 .03 .02 .03
Experience 22.2 18.3 19.2 21.7 21.7 18.6 21
Job Tenure 11.3 6.9 6.6 10.6 8.5 6 7.6
Distribution (%) .12 .22 .16 .13 .25 .23 .24
Services (%) .35 .24 .26 .33 .38 .34 .367
Education: Degree (%) .22 .12 .12 .21 .09 .07 .08
Education: A Level (%) .35 .34 .36 .35 .33 .38 .35
Education: O Level (%) .26 .32 .24 .27 .31 .29 .31
Net Wage 7.1 5.3 4.9 6.8 5.4 4.7 5.16
Sample Size 3.157 348 233 3.734 448 245 698
Source: Our Elaboration on BHPS Data
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Table 7: Quit Hazard Rates
Model 1 Model 2
Married 0.033 0.025
(0.253) (0.253)
Education: Degree 0.241 0.236
(0.252) (0.251)
Education: A Level 0.060 0.064
(0.213) (0.214)
Education: O level -0.160 -0.155
(0.223) (0.223)
Children -0.226 -0.227
(0.105)** (0.105)**
Household Size 0.169 0.168
(0.08)** (0.08)**
House Tenant 0.023 0.027
(0.198) (0.198)
Spouse Job -0.008 -0.004
(0.188) (0.188)
Experience 0.124 0.123
(0.06)** (0.06)**
Experience Squared -0.004 -0.004
(0.001)** (0.001)**
Manager & Professional 0.089 0.094
(0.177) (0.178)
White Collar Worker 0.091 0.094
(0.197) (0.197)
Distribution 0.155 0.153
(0.193) (0.193)
Services 0.154 0.142
(0.158) (0.142)
Medium Firm -0.189 -0.192
(0.172) (0.172)
Large Firm -0.151 -0.159
(0.201) (0.201)
Union Member -0.208 -0.206
(0.172) (0.172)
OP-Joined -0.813 -0.859
(0.233)** (0.239)**
OP-No Joined-PP -0.717 -0.713
(0.29)** (0.29)**
OP-No Joined-SERPS -0.757 -0.755
(0.333)** (0.333)**
NO OP-PP -0.393 -0.383
(0.254) (0.254)
Pension Loss 0.059
(0.066)
Log Likelihood -883 -882
Spells Ended from Risk 251 251
Sample Size 4.427 4.427
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Table 8: Semiparametric Baseline Quit Hazards
Model 1 Model 2
dur1 -1.892 -1.854
(0.676)** (0.677)**
dur2 -2.848 -2.812
(0.676)** (0.676)**
dur3 -2.924 -2.890
(0.686)** (0.686)**
dur4 -2.801 -2.769
(0.676)** (0.676)**
dur5 -3.031 -3.004
(0.688)** (0.689)**
dur6 -3.226 -3.201
(0.692)** (0.692)**
dur7 -3.125 -3.108
(0.699)** (0.699)**
dur8 -3.790 -3.777
(0.733)** (0.733)**
dur9 -3.776 -3.770
(0.734)** (0.734)**
dur10 -3.796 -3.797
(0.745)** (0.745)**
dur11 -3.600 -3.609
(0.743)** (0.744)**
dur12+ -3.951 -4.006
(0.694)** (0.698)**
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Table 9: Quit Hazards Rates. Simple and IV Models
Simple Quit Hazards IV Quit Hazards
Model 1 Model 2 Probit 1st step LPM 1st step
Married 0.024 0.013 -0.003 -0.010
(0.252) (0.253) (0.259) (0.252)
Education: Degree 0.222 0.212 0.186 0.142
(0.250) (0.249) (0.282) (0.260)
Education: A Level 0.048 0.049 0.031 0.017
(0.213) (0.213) (0.224) (0.214)
Education: O Level -0.169 -0.167 -0.167 -0.174
(0.222) (0.222) (0.225) (0.221)
Children -0.227 -0.228 -0.229 -0.238
(0.104)** (0.105)** (0.114)** (0.105)**
Household Size 0.172 0.171 0.173 0.178
(0.080)** (0.080)** (0.089)** (0.080)**
House Tenant 0.040 0.043 0.061 0.061
(0.197) (0.197) (0.201) (0.195)
Spouse Job -0.009 -0.006 -0.000 0.007
(0.188) (0.188) (0.204) (0.187)
Experience 0.121 0.119 0.121 0.123
(0.059)** (0.059)** (0.063)** (0.059)**
Experience Squared -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001)**
Manager & Professional 0.075 0.058 0.013 -0.023
(0.175) (0.176) (0.181) (0.186)
White Collar Worker 0.076 0.074 0.037 0.000
(0.196) (0.196) (0.213) (0.193)
Distribution 0.150 0.147 0.149 0.157
(0.193) (0.193) (0.204) (0.193)
Services 0.146 0.135 0.176 0.196
(0.158) (0.158) (0.177) (0.160)
Medium Firm -0.182 -0.184 -0.278 -0.342
(0.172) (0.172) (0.204) (0.196)
Large Firm -0.144 -0.154 -0.243 -0.322
(0.200) (0.201) (0.24) (0.246)
Union Member -0.218 -0.221 -0.202 -0.353
(0.170) (0.170) (0.192) (0.201)
OP -0.578 -0.578 -0.195 0.139
(0.170)** (0.175)** (0.504) (0.667)
Pension Loss 0.056
(0.065)
Log Likelihood -883.8 -883.5 -889.5 -889.5
Spells Ended From Risk 251 251 251 251
Sample Size 4.427 4.427 4.427 4.427
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Table 10: Semiparametric Baseline Quit Hazards
Simple Quit Hazards IV Quit Hazards
Model 1 Model 2 Probit 1st step LPM 1st step
dur1 -2.017 -1.959 -2.158 -2.320
(0.664)** (0.667)** (0.708)** (0.735)**
dur2 -2.987 -2.932 -3.148 -3.318
(0.664)** (0.666)** (0.712)** (0.742)**
dur3 -3.078 -3.025 -3.229 -3.404
(0.673)** (0.675)** (0.724)** (0.754)**
dur4 -2.955 -2.904 -3.120 -3.298
(0.664)** (0.666)** (0.717)** (0.749)**
dur5 -3.186 -3.140 -3.381 -3.575
(0.676)** (0.678)** (0.740)** (0.773)**
dur6 -3.395 -3.353 -3.588 -3.777
(0.680)** (0.681)** (0.740)** (0.773)**
dur7 -3.283 -3.249 -3.481 -3.678
(0.688)** (0.689)** (0.752)** (0.786)**
dur8 -3.955 -3.927 -4.157 -4.352
(0.723)** (0.723)** (0.783)** (0.817)**
dur9 -3.941 -3.918 -4.141 -4.336
(0.722)** (0.723)** (0.783)** (0.818)**
dur10 -3.953 -3.938 -4.153 -4.347
(0.735)** (0.735)** (0.793)** (0.827)**
dur11 -3.758 -3.752 -3.975 -4.173
(0.734)** (0.734)** (0.793)** (0.829)**
dur12+ -4.120 -4.158 -4.331 -4.540
(0.683)** (0.686)** (0.754)** (0.793)**
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Table 11: Pension O¤er Rates by Region of Residence
Inner London 84.21
Outer London 83.61
South East 75.36
South West 78.02
East Anglia 77.08
East Midlands 77.33
West Midlands Conurbation 68
West Midlands 84.93
Greater Manchester 81.08
Merseyside 69.23
North West 79.66
South Yorkshire 68.97
West Yorkshire 69.05
York & Humberside 69.23
Tyne & Wear 76.19
North 85.71
Wales 71.7
Scotland 76.6
Source: Our Elaboration on BHPS Data
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Table 12: OP Coverage Model
Probit LPM
Married 0.045 0.055
(.199) (.045)
Education: Degree 0.094 0.093
(.204)** (.041)**
Education: A Level 0.039 0.035
(.155) (.036)
Education: O Level 0.003 -0.002
(.152) (.035)
Children 0.011 0.014
(.083) (.018)
Household Size -0.010 -0.014
(.061) (.015)
House Tenant -0.017 -0.020
(.136) (.036)
Spouse Job -0.024 -0.028
(.155) (.031)
Experience 0.002 0.001
(.042) (.01)
Experience Squared -0.000 0.000
(.001) (.0002)
Manager & Prof. 0.104 0.138
(.139)** (.03)**
White Collar Worker 0.109 0.151
(.154)** (.032)**
Distribution -0.006 -0.011
(.145) (.039)
Services -0.079 -0.062
(.126)** (.026)**
Medium Firm 0.161 0.230
(.14)** (.027)**
Large Firm 0.200 0.251
(.256)** (.026)**
Union Member 0.159 0.173
(.146)** (.024)**
OP O¤er Rate 0.008 0.007
(.011)** (.002)**
Sample Size 1.081 1.081
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